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Two of the fundamental concepts in the tax system, (1) that each
corporation is a separate taxpayer, and (2) that each tax year is a
distinct reporting period-trigger the need to resolve how to deal with
the averaging function for businesses that have operating losses in
some years and profits in others, or businesses that have net losses
over a period of years. Section 172 of the Code provides the averag-
ing mechanism - the net operating loss carryover. When corpora-
tions change businesses, when shareholders change, and when one
corporation acquires another (often lured by unused loss carry-
overs), Congress and the courts have imposed special restrictions on
the use of these loss carryovers to offset other income.
Professor Eustice opens the discussion with a description of the
1976 amendments (not yet fully operative) to section 382, and the
history of other provisions as a back-drop to the proposed changes
by the Senate Finance Committee Staff Report. His outline, Appen-
dix A to his talk, provides us with a comprehensive roadmap to the
limitations proposed, including how they would operate in practice.
Mr. Portney then considers the reform proposals for the net oper-
ating loss carryover and the types of considerations that merit dis-
cussion in choosing the appropriate restrictions on carryovers. Mr.
Portney presents a strong case in favor of simplicity. He argues also
that the statute should restrict the use of corporate acquisitions for
the purpose of obtaining loss carryovers and suggests methods for
accomplishing that sort of restriction.
Professor Eustice then discusses alternatives for limiting loss car-
ryovers, one based on the purchase price of the business and the
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other based on the future income stream from the pool of capital in
existence at the time of the acquisition. Noting that the former is
his personal favorite, he nevertheless would be favorably inclined
toward the latter if it is more politically feasible for the reason that
he believes it is time for a conclusion to the long and exceedingly
complicated struggle to define the limits on the use of net operating
loss carryovers.
CARRYOVER OF CORPORATE TAX
ATTRIBUTES
JAMES S. EUSTICE*
At this present moment (April 27, 1984), the status of section 382
limitations on loss carryovers is in a very interesting posture. When
Gerry and I were deciding how to split up our topic, one of the sug-
gestions was that Gerry would take the effective date extender of the
House Ways and Means committee and I would take the Senate ef-
fective date extender. In that way, we could leave after about three
minutes.
Technically, we presently have in place half of the 1976 Reform
Act legislation under section 382(b). It became effective on January
1 of 1984; the other half, section 382(a), is due to become effective
on June 30, 1984. However, both of those provisions are due to be
extended in the pending legislation which will roll both aspects of
section 382 forward two more years, to 1986.1 At one time there was
an interesting little statutory gap in section 381 and section 382. I
don't think it would have been wise to exploit it, but for a short
period of time in early 1984, there were no technical limitations on
the type-G insolvency reorganization. The 1976 Act had become ef-
fective, but didn't mention the type-G reorganization by name (for
the obvious reason that it was drafted before we had this type of
reorganization). Some people were running around saying let's do
insolvency acquisitions quickly before they find it. But, they found it,
so that particular game is over before it really began.2
* Becker Professor of Law, New York University; B.S., LL.B., University of Illi-
nois; LL.M., New York University School of Law.
1. This proposal passed; see Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 62(a), Pub. L. No. 98-
369, § 861, 98 Stat. 494, 678 (1984) (amending § 806(g) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
(26 U.S.C. 382)).
2. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, § 62(b), Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 861, 98 Stat.
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Despite Assistant Secretary Pearlman's statement at lunch that
the Treasury Department wants to do something about section 382
(anything just so they can stop thinking about it), we will attempt to
explore some of the possible reform proposals that have been ad-
vanced on how to revise the loss carryover rules of present law. By
present law, I mean the pre-1976 Act rules of sections 269 and 381.
As some would say, this may well be the most punishing of all the
Subchapter C related sports. The fundamental problem here, I be-
lieve, has been eluded to both publicly and privately. Other recent,
more limited legislative efforts (i.e. the Installment Sales Revision
Act of 1980,1 the Bankruptcy Tax Act legislation in 1980,4 even the
Subchapter S Revision Act of 19825) were, on the whole, essentially
consensus group efforts; not totally, and not on every point, but there
was a broad spectrum of agreement that this was the way to go, and
certainly so on the fundamentals. That is not the case with net oper-
ating losses, despite the current flurry of proposals based on the ALI
project. Even the ALI project was, initially at least, not a clear con-
sensus product. This lack of consensus makes it extremely unlikely
that Congress will be able to devise a solution to the loss carryover
problem that everyone loves, or at least doesn't hate excessively. The
important point here, as in many areas of the tax law, is that there
probably is no "right answer." It is equally clear, however, that there
should be an answer, which is definitely not the case now.
When talking about a corporation's tax history, one is really
describing the obverse of its economic history. I'll elaborate on that.
If you are having a bad economic year you are creating good tax
history, with such things as loss carryovers, carrybacks, ITC carry-
overs and a host of other things that are valuable under our present
tax system. If you are having a good economic year you are creating
a bad tax history, i.e., earnings and profits, appreciated assets, etc.
The question of course is what can we do, or what should we allow to
be done, with that tax history? Is it assignable? Or is it perpetually
locked into the persons or entity that generated it?
I'm going to talk primarily about tax losses, because that's the
major element in this game. We really have three functionally differ-
ent types of tax losses depending primarily on their maturation. By
that I mean, if they have already been sustained and have not been
currently consumed, in either the present year or by carryback, they
create a carryover deduction for the future, which now lasts for
494, 678 (1984) (Retroactive technical amendment to § 382(b) adding type-G reorgani-
zation limitations).
3. Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247
(1980) (amending I.R.C. § 453 and § 453(B)).
4. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1980).
5. Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
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fifteen years. Another element in the tax loss scene, however, is eco-
nomically accrued potential, or "built-in" losses, viz., high-basis-low-
value situations. These are somewhat fluid, in that a taxpayer can
claim those losses whenever he decides to dispose of the property in a
taxable event. Finally, the third type of losses are those that arise in
the future from continuing operations. The tax rules of the present
system and even those of future proposed systems deal differently
with all three types of losses.
Moreover, the current tax regime and many of the reform propos-
als to be mentioned today as well, contain certain basic analytic
themes and factors, such as the form or structure of the acquisition.
That has always been a significant factor here. While not conclusive,
it has been essential to the tax characterization of the transaction.
Namely, whether the transaction is taxable or tax-free, whether it
represents an acquisition of assets or of stock, and which particular
entity survives the transaction, have all made a difference, still make
a difference, and will probably continue to make a difference under
any of the various reform proposals. Furthermore, the continuity of
shareholder proprietary interest is, to a varying degree, an equally
and in some respects, a more important consideration in this area, as
is the continuity of historic business enterprise concept. Although the
latter has occupied a somewhat lesser role. Here too, we have to
think of this latter concept in three variations. One could focus pri-
marily on the particular business unit, or division, a concept derived
from the Libson Shops6 case, which first articulated that view. There
is also a statutory business continuity rule which is still present in
section 382(a). This rule, unlike Libson Shops, focuses on the char-
acter or type of business activity which must be continued. The regu-
lations under section 368 impose an additional "historic" business
continuity requirement as a condition for tax-free reorganization
treatment. In many of the transactions to be discussed today, you
cannot have a carryover (nor, for that matter, survival of the history)
if you don't have an underlying tax-free reorganization. Finally, we
have those general judicially based doctrines of business purpose, tax
motive, tax windfall, and step transaction, stemming from the
landmark Gregory decision. These doctrines attempt to limit overly
aggressive transactions to prevent taxpayers from obtaining unwar-
6. Libson Shops v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957) (no carryover of losses gener-
ated by one business to profits of another business).
7. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (transaction with no business pur-
pose fails as tax-free reorganization).
ranted tax results.
The present statutory and regulatory regime limiting or dealing
with the negotiability of tax benefits (particularly losses) can be clas-
sified broadly into two principal types of limitation. The so-called
automatic, or rule-of-thumb, provisions, which do not depend for
their application on state of mind or intent, and those where a tax
avoidance intent is necessary for application of the statute. Foremost
among the former type of limitation is section 382. Moreover, the
consolidated return regulations are another example of automatic
non-state-of-mind limitation provisions. On the other hand, section
269 is the paradigm of a tax-motive-based section. If you do some-
thing, or try to do something for the wrong tax motives, then the
statute allows the Commissioner to take away the hoped for tax ben-
efits. ' Section 367(a) was also (at least until recently) a tax avoid-
ance-motive-based provision. Before getting into the details of these
various limitations, however, I think a short page of history is in-
structive here. It's hard to remember where we are without recalling
from where we've come.
Essentially, the chronology of the loss carryover area breaks down
into at least three major geological periods. The pre-1954 code years,
in which it is safe to say that form was triumphant. This was the age
of "entity-identity" dominance, represented by the New Colonial
Ice8 and Metropolitan Edison9 decisions. Starting in 1954, however,
there was a significant downgrading of the entity theory. We are still
operating (and are likely to continue to do so, at least through 1985)
under the 1954 Code regime. This system is comprised of sections
381 and 382, which are both relatively mechanical provisions dealing
with various forms of acquisition, both taxable and tax-free, back-
stopped by the state-of-mind provisions in section 269. There has
been no material change in those provisions for thirty years. There
have been attempts, primarily in 1976, but no significant changes
have yet been made in that structure.
Following the 1954 Code, however, we have several key dates. The
decision in Libson Shops'0 in 1957, which articulated what I call the
"schedular" tax limitation regime (that each separate trade or busi-
ness unit is forever locked with its own tax loss history). That, how-
ever, was a case involving a 1939 Code year, and it immediately
became a point of controversy as to what extent Libson Shops ap-
plied under the 1954 Code. I think today it seems to be relatively
well-settled that it probablydoesn't apply, but there is a lurking pos-
sibility that it does. Certainly the Service thinks that there is still
8. New Colonial Ice v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
9. Helvering v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 306 U.S. 522 (1939).
10. Libson Shops v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
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some role for Libson Shops. The committee reports in 1976 refused
to kill it completely, so I think you would be excessively optimistic to
say you can forget about it altogether. It's still out there in the
minds of the IRS and it's clearly lurking in several examples in the
section 382(a) regulations. Moreover, until last year this principle
was evident in the type "F" reorganization carryback cases;" but
TEFRA repealed the multiple corporate "F" reorganization possibil-
ity in 1982. The Service had gradually conceded that you could have
loss carrybacks in multiple corporate type "F" reorganizations, but
they and several courts applied Libson Shops tracing limitations.
Another significant date during this period was the restructuring
of the consolidated return regulations in 1966. These new regulations
adopted an elaborate regulatory limitations system, the key to which
is one of my favorite acronyms (in view of its function), the SRLY
limitation. This concept is essentially a Libson Shops-type limitation
applied to a subsidiary rather than to a division. The consolidated
return regulations operate automatically, without regard to motive or
intent, and clearly backstop the 381 and 382 provisions.
The year 1976, however, was the beginning of the third major
phase of the loss carryover tax chronology, the complete rewriting
(in conference) of section 382. This provision began as a relatively
minor amendment to section 382 in the Senate bill, but came out of
conference as a wonderously baroque and fearsomely intricate piece
of legislation. It did, however, have a two-year delayed effective date
so they could think about it some more. This is now turning into the
longest delayed provision around. This process usually leads to even-
tual repeal, which is apparently going to happen with generation-
skipping and in fact happened with the carryover basis rules. At
least it put in place an alternative system for dealing with net oper-
ating loss carryovers. The dominant theme of this provision, in fact
its only theme, was primacy of the shareholder continuity of interest
test. Everything else was irrelevant: corporate identity, business con-
tinuity, and historic business no longer were important; the only
thing that counted for tax history survival was shareholder
continuity.
The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198012 was also a significant event for
the loss carryover system. Until the 1980 revision, an insolvent
debtor could avoid taxation on its so-called negative profits, that is,
the gain arising from extinguishment of its debts at a bargain price,
11. See, e.g., Commissioner v. National Tea Co., 83 T.C. 8 (1984).
12. Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980).
without any toll charge for that amnesty, other than a reduction of
its bases (and you could finesse that problem in a variety of ways).
The key to the 1980 bankruptcy amendments was that debtorsnow
will have to pay a toll charge in order to exclude debt discharge
income, other than merely reducing basis. This change consists of a
reduction in the debtor's loss carryovers, followed, in a descending
order of priority, by a reduction in other enumerated tax benefits.
This system is analogous, in many respects, to the toll charge system
that is imposed on outbound and inbound transfers under section
367.
In 1981, the life of loss carryovers was expanded to fifteen years,
which gave taxpayers considerably greater time to take advantage of
these benefits. Another key provision enacted in 1981, which is prob-
ably the engine that is really driving the attempts to revise section
382 was the ACRS cost recovery system. This legislation resulted in
the allowance of huge depreciation deductions for capital intensive
industries. As a result, many corporations quickly developed large
pools of unusable tax losses, unlikely to be absorbed even over a
fifteen year term. Safe harbor leasing (also enacted in 1981) pro-
vided a mechanism for the outright sale of these benefits. Its repeal
in 1982 has resulted in renewed efforts by taxpayers to negotiate
their tax losses that cannot be used effectively in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Consequently, today we have a tax loss carryover system obvi-
ously ripe for review. There are at least five, and possibly more, dif-
ferent proposals for the reform of this area.
Before getting into those proposals, I would like to mention that
the current law rules are summarized in Part III of the outline (see
appendix). I don't want to spend any particular time on these provi-
sions here, because that's not our function today; we are dealing with
proposals to reform the loss carryover world, not describing the car-
ryover world that is. I do want to call attention, however, to one
particular gap in current law that is about to be fixed by the pending
1984 legislation. At section B(2) of Part III of outline, a situation is
described where a profit corporation buys a loss company's stock,
and then tries to bring those losses into conjunction with its profits, a
situation strongly inhibited by our current loss carryover regime.
Congress bore down rather heavily on the obverse of that situation
in the 1982 TEFRA legislation. Some would say that Congress fo-
cused so hard on the hole that they forgot the donut, because they
concentrated totally on the tax avoidance potential from loss com-
pany acquisitions of profit companies. Briefly, if the loss company
liquidated the acquired company under section 332 or under section
382, all of its recapture income would be triggered, the tax basis for
its assets would be stepped-up, but the resulting recapture income
would be sheltered by the loss company's carryovers. This device was
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stopped by the TEFRA legislation. What was overlooked, however,
was the fact that if a profit company bought the stock of a loss com-
pany (the paradigm potential loss trafficking problem), but didn't
elect section 338, then under the new 1982 statutory regime there
was a mandatory carryover basis result. This brought with it all of
the target corporation's tax history on a subsequent liquidation. Even
more importantly, the new law effected a clear overruling of the
step-transaction doctrine represented by Kimbell-Diamond.13 Thus,
it readily became apparent that taxpayers could have a profit com-
pany, buy stock of a loss company, not elect section 338 (which you
obviously wouldn't do here because that would purge the company of
its tax history), upstream the target's assets in a section 332 liquida-
tion (neither section 269 nor section 382 applied to this transaction),
and everything was simply wonderful. Congress, by closing a "pin-
hole," had brilliantly succeeded in opening a mega-loophole in the
loss carryover limitation defense system.
At Part III, section B(2)(b)(iii) of the outline, however, there is a
reference to the Tax Reform Act of 1984. This provision was in the
Technical Corrections Bill, which started out in 1983 and is now in
the 1984 legislation. 4 There is a specific amendment to section 269,
which would retroactively plug this particular gap.
With that I would like to turn matters over to my colleague, Mr.
Portney who will tell us how he plans to deal with the "destiny of
loss carryovers;" it will be billed as the fatalistic approach.
13. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74, afd per curiam,
187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
14. See section 26 U.S.C. § 269(b) as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 712(i)(8)(A), 98 Stat. 494, 952 (1984).
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("Loss" corporation, i.e., corporation having
potential tax benefits (PTB's), such as net op-
erating loss carryover (NOL), high basis, low
value assets, E and P deficit, etc.).
(Shareholders of L).
("Profit" corporation, i.e., corporation that
can make use of L's tax benefits).
(Provision allowing carryover of PTB's in cer-
tain types of tax-free acquisitions).
(Disallow NOL of L if stock purchase causes
a 50% change of ownership of L and if L has
a "change of business" character within a
certain time).
(Reduce NOL pro tanto if A ownership of L
or P drops below 20% as a result of tax-free
"asset reorganization").
(Disallow L's PTB's if control, 50%, of L ac-
quired for principal purpose of tax avoid-
ance).
(Disallow L's PTB's if a carryover basis asset
acquisition for principal purpose of tax avoid-
ance).
(Supreme Court decision denying offset of
NOL's from one "business unit" against
profits of another "business unit").
(Transaction must have business purpose or
economic reality aside from saving taxes;
"sham" or "step" transaction won't be ac-
cepted for tax purposes).
(Greatly tighten section 382 rules; also, sig-
nificantly downgrade section 269; but not ef-
fective initially until 1978; extended until
1986).
B. Factors and General Themes
1. Tax "losses" vary in respect of their "maturation", viz.:
(a) sustained losses (carryovers),
* All rights reserved, James S. Eustice, 1984.
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(b) potential losses (high basis),
(c) future operating losses, expected or unexpected.
2. Factors of Analysis:
(a) Forms of acquisition:
(i) taxable or tax-free,
(ii) stock or assets,
(iii) who survives (entity-identity aspects);
(b) Continuity of proprietary interest (viz., shareholders'
continuity):
(c) Continuity of business enterprise:
(i) Libson "units" aspects,
(ii) "Character" of business aspects,
(iii) Regs. section 1.368-1(d), historic business or historic
business assets continued (necessary for reorganization
status);
(d) Business purpose, tax motive, and tax windfall aspects.
3. Statutory and judicial defenses to negotiation of PTB's:
(a) Automatic rules of thumb (no "scienter" here):
(i) Sections 381, 382, 383, Con. Ret. Regs.;
(ii) Libson Shops;
(b) "State of mind", or rules of general principle (intent rules):
(i) Sections 269, 367;
(ii) Gregory, Knetsch, Goldstein, et al.
II. Historical Chronology-Key Dates
A. 1939 Code Years
1. 1934 - New Colonial Ice (entity emphasis)
2. 1939 - Metropolitan Edison (merger)
3. 1942 - Consolidated Return Regs.
4. 1944 - Section 269 (state of mind - tax avoidance)
5. 1948 - Alprosa interlude (form triumphant?)
B. 1954 Code Years
1. 1954 - Statutory system for attribute carryovers
(a) Section 381
(i) Transactions, section 381(a) (section 332 and section
334(b)(1), and section 368(a)(1) A, C, D, and F)
A. But not Bs and not "divisive" Ds.
(ii) Operating rules, section 381(b)
A. New importance for Type F reorg.
(iii) Specific items, §381(c) (selective list)
(b) Section 382 limitations (objective) (apply only to NOLs
though)
(i) Stock purchase and business character change
(ii) Asset reorganization - minimum continuity line of 20%
(relative size test)
2. 1957 - Libson Shops (division and business unit quarantine)
(a) Rev. Rul. 58-603 (not apply if section 381)
(b) Rev. Rul. 59-395 (application to '39 Code years)
3. 1963 - Rev. Rul. 63-40 (Libson and '54 Code - no section 381)
(Textron pattern)
4. 1964 - Multiples legislation, sections 1561-1563
5. Maxwell Hardward (Libson not apply to '54 Code)
(a) TIR 773 contra (expanded section 382 notions)
6. 1966 - New Consolidated Return Regs. (SRLY et al.)
7. 1969 - Multiples tightened again
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8. 1971 - Section 383 (expanded list of items subject to section 382)
9. 1975 - IRS gives up on NOL carrybacks after "expanded type
F", Rev. Rul. 75-561
10. 1976 - TRA of 1976'(see generally, JSE, 32 Tax L. Rev. 113
(1977))
(a) Tightened section 382 (but delayed effective date)
(b) Loosened section 172 (seven-year carryover; waiver of
carryback)
(c) Comm. Rep. downplay section 269 and Libson - reserve for
"special cases"
(d) Section 382 continues to be delayed (until 1985; but section
382(b) now effective)
11. BTA of 1980
(a) Expand section 381 for insolvency Reorgs. (Type G)
(b) But debt discharge gain "absorbs" attributes, §108(b)
(c) See generally, JSE, 36 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1980)
12. ERTA of 1981
(a) Expand NOL and ITC carryovers to fifteen years
(b) Section 168(0(8) safe harbor leasing rules allow
"negotiation" of certain tax benefits (ACRS deductions and
ITC)
13. TEFRA of 1982
(a) Section 338 for section 334(b)(2) (history purged)
(b) No section 338, then section 381
(c) Multiple F's gone (query Aetna and Bercy Inds?)
(d) Section 269A - anti-Keller
(e) Phaseout of safe harbor leasing rules
14. 1983 - SFC Staff Report on Reform of Subchapter C
(a) New section 382 based on ALI "pool of capital" approach
(b) Repeal section 269
15. 1984 - TRA of 1976 section 382(b) becomes effective
III. Transactions - General Patterns and Principles
A. Tax-free Acquisitions
1. P acquires L assets in tax-free "A" or "C" reorganization:
(a) Section 381 o.k. (but L's year "closes" so two years of NOL
used up):
(i) Post-fusion carrybacks - generally no; section
381(b)(3); unless Type F (then allow, but Libson
tracing limits, Rev. Rul. 75-561);
(ii) For "expanded" view of "F" where fusion of
commonly controlled operating companies, see Aetna
Casualty, and Home Construction;
(iii) But TEFRA limits "F" to single operating company;
(iv) Bercy Inds. (triangular "A" functional equivalent of
"B" for carrybacks); maybe survive TEFRA
amendments too?
(b) Section 382(b) if A owns less than 20% of P after
reorganization (but can avoid by having an 80% subsidiary
of P make the acquisition for stock of P, i.e., "triangular"
merger deal):
(i) Query section 368(a)(2)(E) reverse merger (functional
"B" reorg.?), see Bercy Inds.;
(ii) Proposed Amendments to section 382(b) (raise
continuity to 40%; also eliminate triangular escape);
(c) Section 269(a)(2) if P acquires L for tax avoidance;
(d) Libson not applicable because section 381, Rev. Rul. 66-214;
but see Rev. Rul. 75-561 (Libson still apply for carrybacks).
2. P acquires L stock in "B" reorganization and:
(a) P and L file a consolidated return (CR):
(i) CR Regs apply SRLY Libson-type limits (i.e., L's
PTB's can only be used by L on a CR); but future
losses generally usable in CR;
(ii) Section 269(a)(1) could either disallow use of CR by
P and L or could disallow L's use of its PTB's (Hall
Paving Co.);
(iii) Proposed Amendments to section 382(b) - apply 40%
test here too;
(b) Or P liquidates L tax-free under section 332:
(i) Section 381 o.k. on P liquidation of L (purges SRLY
and ELA);
(ii) IRS says (Rev. RuL. 67-274) "steps" a disguised "C"
reorganization so section 382(b) and section 269(a)(2)
apply - but if "steps" respected (i.e., if transaction
was a "B" reorganization followed by an independent
section 332 liquidation), neither section 382(b) nor
section 269 apply; see Resorts Int'l, Inc. Also, above
step rule not preempted by TEFRA repeal of Kimbell-
Diamond;
(iii) Query Libson? IRS says "yes" if "change of L
business" ala section 382(a) but courts so far say
"no" ;
(iv) Note, Proposed Amendments to section 382(b) would
dilute L's NOL's at first step;
(c) Or P merges "downstream" into L (same as (b) above),
Rev. Rul. 70-223; Rev. Rul. 76-36:
(d) Or P "builds up" L by adding assets, feeding in new
business, or general competence:
(i) Section 269(a)(1) or (2) could apply but "business
purpose" ought to protect, see Glen Raven Mills;
(ii) Section 482 might "dilute" L's PTB's if dealings
between P and L cause reallocation of income or
deductions of either P or L; watch non-arm's length
terms - will trigger new prices per section 482 clear
reflection;
(iii) Section 382 not applicable and Libson probably o.k.
here too;
(iv) But Proposed Amendment to section 382(b) loses
NOL's pro tanto if continuity drops below 40%.
3. L acquires P assets in "A" or "C" reorganization:
(a) Section 381 o.k. (re P's attributes), but no "double" NOL
year as in 1 (a) above;
(b) Section 382(b) and section 269(a)(2) ("reverse" acquisition)
apply;
(i) Proposed Amendments - raise continuity line to 40%;
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(c) Libson "no" says IRS. But cf. Rev. Rul. 75-561 (for
carrybacks).
4. L acquires P stock in "B" reorganization and:
(a) L and P file CR:
(i) Section 269(a)(1) could deny CR or use of PTB's if
tax avoidance (Hall Paving Co.);
(ii) CR Regs silent here (i.e., no Libson-type limits) unless
transaction constitutes a "reverse acquisition" (i.e., P
in substance has acquired L because of relative size),
which will trigger SRLY rules;
(iii) Proposed Amendments apply section 382(b) to "B"
reorg. (and apply 40% continuity line);
(b) Or L liquidates P under section 332:
(i) Section 269(a)(2) and section 382(b) if "steps"
collapsed and transaction a disguised "C";
(ii) If separate steps respected, Libson only worry, and
that's nominal here;
(iii) but Proposed Amendments apply section 382(b) to
"B" reorgs.;
(c) Or L merges "downstream" into P (same as (b) above).
5. Note that in all of above transactions if reorganization (or other
tax-free) status denied (or "rearranged") ala Gregory, PTB's
could be lost because:
(a) No section 381 unless "A" or "C" reorg. or a section 382
liquidation:
(i) See Regs. section 1.368-1(d) (1980) (continuity of
business enterprise);
(b) and collapsing integrated steps can trigger limits of section
269 and/or section 382 (Rev RuL. 67-274).
6. Post-fusion carrybacks if Type F (see section 381(b)):
(a) Rev. Rul. 75-561 (yes, through Libson tracing limits);
(b) Triangulars - cf. Casco, Aetna, and Bercy (functional Bs);
(c) But TEFRA limits "F" to single operating company.
B. Taxable Acquisitions
1. P buys L assets for cash (or debt); no section 381 so PTB's stay
with L.
2. P buys L stock and:
(a) P and L file CR;
(i) Section 269(a)(1), section 382(a) (if L "change of
business"), and CR Regs SRLY rules (limit PTB's to
L's own profits on the CR), see Hall Paving Co.;
(ii) Proposed Amendments to section 382(a) drop business
continuity test;
(b) Or P liquidates L under section 332;
(i) No section 381 if section 334(b)(2) liquidation (i.e., P
gets "cost" basis for L assets rather than carryover);
(section 338 election - same);
(ii) If "delay" so no section 334(b)(2), then L's PTB's
carryover per section 381 and no section 269 or
section 382 if stock purchase and subsequent
liquidation respected as separate steps;
(iii) TEFRA (non-election of section 338) - step risk gone;
but H.R. 4170 (Tax Reform Act of 1984) expands
section 269 to cover tax motivated liquidations within
two years of section 338 "purchase";
(iv) IRS may argue section 269(a)(1) if single "plan" in
(ii) above and same for section 382(a) (if "change of
business" of L); (but TEFRA changes step rules here,
supra);
(v) Proposed Amendments to section 382(a) drop business
continuity test;
(c) Or P merges "downstream" into L (same as (b)(ii) and (iii)
above);
(d) P "builds up" L by adding assets, feeding in new business or
general competence;
(i) Section 269(a)(1) or (2) risk here but will be o.k. if
can show business purpose;
(ii) Section 382(a) risk if L "change of business" (but
"expansion" not and neither is addition of new
business if old continued);
(iii) Section 482 allocation possible though if non-arms'
length terms;
(iv) Proposed Amendments to section 382(a) kill L's
NOL's pro tanto if more than 60% change of
ownership.
3. L buys P assets:
(a) No sections 269, 382, or Libson if A continues to own L;
(b) If 50% change of ownership of L: section 382(a) could apply
if also a change of L business (but "addition" or
"expansion" of business not a prohibited change); IRS also
says Libson could apply here too but courts so far say "no";
also, section 269(a)(1) would apply if tax avoidance; T.LR.
773 vs. Maxwell Hardware;
(c) But general policy to let "loss" business try to rehabilitate
itself so long as don't attempt to negotiate its PTB's.
4. L buys P stock and:
(a) L and P file CR:
(i) CR Regs. impose no limits here - seems L can use its
PTB's on CR against profits of P; see Regs. section
1.1502-21(c)(3), Ex. (2);
(ii) But section 269(a)(1) could deny CR if tax avoidance,
which seems unlikely in view of 3(a) route above;
(iii) But if 50% change of ownership of L as well CR
Regs. apply Libson limits to L (CRCO); also section
382(a) could apply if change of L business; also
section 269(a)(I) possibility increased;
(iv) Proposed Amendments to section 382(a) (L's NOL's
reduced pro tanto if more than 60% change of
ownership);
(v) TEFRA - section 338 election (inside basis step-up - P
recaptures out of L's consolidated ret.).
(b) L liquidates P per sections 332, 334(b)(2) (same as (3)
above, i.e., essentially an asset purchase by L); TEFRA
section 338 same (but recaptures out of L's consolidated
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ret.):
(c) L merges "downstream" into P:
(i) L PTB's carryover per section 381:
(ii) Section 269(a)(2) o.k. and so is section 382(b). But cf.
Regs. section 1.269-6, Ex. (3) (common control
exception not applicable here).
IV. Summary of Current Law
L - Loss A - Shareholders of L
P - Profit B - Shareholders of P
PTBs (Potential Tax Benefits): NOLs (Net Operating Losses), BIDs
(Built-in Deductions), deficits, etc.
Transactions Limitations
I. Tax-Free (Reorganization)
A. Assets ("A", "C", "G"):
1. L to P for P stock 381, 382(b), 269(a)(2)
(direct) 2. P to L for L stock 381, 382(b), 269(a)(2)
3. L to P's sub for P stock 381. 382(b). 269(a)(2)
(trian-
gular) 4. P to L's sub for L stock
B. Stock ("B", reverse merger)
1. A to P for P stock:
(a) P & L file C.R.,




(c) P merges down
into L,
2. B to L for L stock:
(a) L and P file C.R.,




1. L to P for cash:
(a) L stays alive,
(b) L liquidates,
2. P to L for cash,
B. Stock
1. A to P for cash:
(a) P and L file C.R.,
(b) P liquidates L,
(c) P merges down
into L,
2. B to L for cash:
(a) L and P file C.R.,
(b) L liquidates P,









If reverse acq., same as 1(a)
Same as A.2.
Limitations
PTBs stay with L (no 381)
PTBs disappear
No limits (Rev. Rul. 63-40)
SRLY, BID, 269(a)(1), 382(a)
Same as A.L.(b), (if 338)
269(a)(1), 382(a)
No limits (L 338 bf P)
Same as A.2. (if 338)
381, 382(b), 269(a)(2)
V. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
A. Possible Approaches
1. Free Trade, viz., no limitations (NOL's become a recoupment
mechanism)?
2. Total quarantine, viz., no assignability? (e.g., ALI):
3. Some limitations:
(a) Pure objective "rules of thumb" (ala sections 381, 382);
(b) Pure "state of mind" (ala section 269); tax avoidance motive
focus;
(c) Combination (present system).
4. Keep present system as is? Known devil better than unknown?
(a) Seems to work (or does it)?
5. Modify present system:
(a) Focus on objective shareholder ownership continuity (TRA
'76 model)? ALI focus.
(b) Focus on business continuity (ala section 382(a), or Libson)?
(c) Focus on section 269 in terrorem?(d) Apply toll charge (ala sections 367, 108(b), and add-on
mini-tax)?
6. Integrate corporate-shareholder taxes?
(a) Have we already for large companies (ACRS and leasing)?
(b) Elective for close corporations (Sub. S and debt leverage).
7. Current refund (recoup in year of loss); see 76 N.W.L.Rev. 709(12/81); Tax Notes, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 209 (Oct. 17, 1983).
B. Discussion Points Re Possible
Modifications - In General
1. What is section 172 all about?
(a) Averaging convention (lean years against lush years);
(i) Back (cash refund);
(ii) Forward (tax shelter);
(b) Subsidy for special interests (especially carrybacks);
(i) See section 172(b)(1)(C)-(I)
(c) Incentive for risk-taking (Gov't safety net - risk shared);
(d) Other, e.g., recoupment? See 76 N.W.L.Rev. 709 (1981).
2. Why is section 172 necessary?
(a) Annual taxable year convention (unfair not to allow
spreads);
(i) Compare transactional reporting systems, e.g.,
completed contract, §453, etc.
(b) Progressive rate structure;
(i) But less so for corporations, § 11(b)
3. Who "owns" section 172 benefit (and who should be entitled to
it)?
(a) First loser only? ALI view.
(i) Should loss history be bankable and salable?
(b) Multiplication of taxable entity effect caused by present
corporate tax system:
(i) Corporation a separate taxpayer, and its owners can
change;
(ii) Public vs. closely held distinctions; (traceability?);
-(iii) Pass-through entity - Sub. S (losses flow through to
shareholder-owners);
(c) Form and type of acquisition aspects:
(i) Stock acquisition;
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A. Reofg. (blending of ownership)
B. Purchase (new owner)
(ii) Aisset acquisition;
A. Reorg. (blending of business and ownership)
B. Purchase (fresh start)
4. Interface w1ith Consolidated Return Regulation rules:
(a) Special "universe" for dealing with member tax attributes
(e.g., SRLY, CRCO, RA, BID, DIT, ELA, etc.)
(b) Argument that Regs. should preempt sections 269, 382
limitation system?
(c) Double-dip potential if no consolidated return - cf. section
165(g)(3), Textron (P section 165 loss on investment in S,
and S got section 172 carryover vs. new business income
under Rev. Rul. 63-40).
5. Interface with new BTA attribute consumption rules of section
108(b):
(a) Toll charge imposed for debt discharge gains;
(b) "Leftovers" negotiable to new owners under court supervised
plan? Should section 269 apply here?
6. Other relevant features of tax system bearing on NOL rules:
(a) Ordinary loss preferable to capital loss;
(b) Capital gain preferable to ordinary gain;
(c) Death "purge" of potential gains and losses - §1014;
(d) Split rate system for corporations and individuals - §1
(progressive), §11 (flat);
(e) Realizable event required for taxable gain or loss;
(f) Worthless losses of corporate stock and securities are usually
capital losses (limited use);
(i) But see §165(g)(3) "affiliates" - cf. Textron;
(ii) Also §1244 (small);
(g) New section 385 Regs. encouraged "leverage" by close
corporations (75% debt capital safe harbor); asking for
trouble? Regs. dropped in late 1983;
(h) Expanding scope of Sub. S rules creating bigger pass-
through system for close corporations.
C. ABA Tax Section Proposals
1. Initial proposal - Separate section 382(a) from section 382(b);
move former to section 269, and keep latter in Subchapter C.:
(a) Section 269(a) subjective rule of present law retained;
(b) New section 269(b) objective rule based on old section
382(a) with modifications;
(i) Test group increased to 25 (but no section 318
attribution);
(ii) Proportionate scale-down if exceed 50% line;
(iii) Many of '76 Act exceptions retained;
(iv) Ownership continuity measured by all stock (except
pure preferred);
(v) Change of business test retained;
(c) Section 382 would be confined to reorganizations and section
351 transactions;
(i) Three-party reorg. rules of '76 Act included;
(ii) "B" followed by section 332 within two years treated
as "C";
2. Other aspects of ABA proposal:
(a) Fold section 383 into sections 269 and 382;
(b) Specific provision that both section 269 and section 382 can
apply;
(c) Continuity lines of existing law (50% and 20%) retained;
(d) But this proposal dropped in mid-1981.
3. Revised ABA proposal (1982) - go to exclusive Libson Shops
objective limitation (business unit quarantine); "objective" only
too (i.e., drop section 269):
(a) Single continuity threshold for purchases and mergers (50%);
(b) If threshold is exceeded, then a disproportionate scale-down
of tax attributes (with total elimination at 20%);
(c) Change of ownership test group is the ten largest
shareholders (with section 318);
(d) Limitation would cover built-in deductions and losses (but
not post-acquisition losses).
4. New ABA proposal (1983) - go back to 1958 Advisory Group
approach:
(a) Limit survival of carryovers to half the price paid for the
stock or assets;
(b) Purpose to take the tax profit out of the acquisition by
denying carryovers for acquisitions where price is paid for
the tax attributes rather than for the business;
(c) Carryover would be allowed where acquisition was of a
going business and tax attributes merely incidental to that
acquisition;
(d) Under this proposal, value of the business (apart from tax
benefits to be derived from the carryovers) must be at least
three times the tax benefit, or 1-1/2 times the amount of the
carryovers;
(e) For later version of this approach, see infra Part G.
D. ALl Proposal
1. Principal thrust: allocation of post-acquisition earnings among
parties to the acquisition, and N allowed only against earnings
traceable to old capital interests of loss company ("poll of capital
or joint-venture approach").
(a) Shift focus away from the NOL, and instead to the future
earnings stream against which it may be deducted.
(b) Libson-type restriction based on "old" ownership during
period losses sustained.
(c) If stock of loss company acquired by purchase NOL
deductions limited to a specified rate return on the purchase
price.
(d) Limitations would also cover new stock issued by loss
company (but an exception for cash issues would allow
earnings attributable to new capital equal to those allocable
to old capital).
(e) Built-in deductions (i.e., potential losses would be subjected
to same limitations as sustained NOLs.
(f) Basic theme of ALI proposals is that NOL history
(sustained or potential) belongs only to the owners of the
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loss company that include such loss; thus, to the extent that
new owners enter the loss corporation, its NOL history will
abate pro tanto.
(i) In effect, negotiation of loss history absolutely barred.
2. New limitation proposals have the following features:
(a) Would replace section 269 and section 382;
(b) Would be purely automatic (no tax avoidance test);
(c) Would ignore business continuity;
(d) Seem heavily inspired by SRLY notions of Consolidated
Return Regs.;
(e) No change proposed for divisive transactions;
(f) Post-fusion carrybacks allowable without section 381(b)
limitation.
3. Likelihood of enactment (see SFC Staff, infra Part H, which
generally adopt ALI approach):
(a) Note tie-in to general acquisition proposal;
(b) Any less complex than present system?
(c) Assumes rational Congress?
E. Integration of Corporate-Shareholder Taxes
1. If corporate tax eliminated, no need for NOL carryover rules at
corporate level?
(a) But necessary to preserve system in order to compute
shareholder-level income?
(b) Unless loss flow-through as well?
2. Maybe already a rough form of integration in place now:
(a) Large corporations have ACRS, ITC and leasing;
(b) Close corporations have elective Sub. S or section 385 safe
harbor leverage;
(i) PCs can zero out if Keller stands up, and did, 723
F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983);
3. Likelihood of passage now - nil.
F. Stark Bill - H.R. 6295 (May, 1982)
1. New focus on shareholder ownership continuity for loss generation
year; viz., shareholders in loss year must maintain 60% ownership
continuity to avoid denial of carryover. Thus, shareholders in loss
year are only permitted owners of carryover.
(a) If drop below 20%, loss carryover totally eliminated; between
60% and 20% lines, lose 2-1/2 points of carryover per point
of lost continuity.
(b) Continuity tests the same for taxable stock purchases and
tax-free reorganizations:
(i) Also cover ownership shifts by redemptions and split-
off divisions;
(ii) Only exception is for ownership changes by gift or
death.
(c) Shareholder test group only deals with 5% or greater
shareholders (with section 318).
2. Technical details:
(a) Strong resemblance to TRA '76 special technical rules in
section 382 (which provision would be repealed by new
section 382 rules);
(b) Purpose of new section 382 is to prevent any significant
(more than 40%) traffic in loss corporation ownership;
(c) Operative provisions are in section 382(a), (b) and ()
(d) Special definitions - §382(d);
(e) Operating rules for stock acquisitions - §382(_);
(f) Operating rules for section 382 reorganizations - §382(0;
(g) Definitions of "stock" - §382(g).
3. But this portion of Stark Bill deleted from later (July, 1982)
scaled down version on grounds of prematurity and lack of time
to adequately consider.
G. Bacon-Tomasulo (Purchase-Price Limitation)
1. Based on the 1958 Advisory Group limitation approach which was
keyed to the price paid for the acquired stock or assets, supra,
part C. 4.
(a) Advisory Group proposed to limit carryover survival to only
50% of acquisition price, while this proposal would allow
survival of carryovers in amount equal to the full acquisition
price.
(b) Same limitation would apply taxable acquisitions of stock,
tax-free reorganization acquisitions of stock or assets, to new
issues of stock in exchange for new money or property, and
to changes in control by redemption or recapitalization
exchanges of existing shares.
(c) Limitation would be triggered by major control shift within
a limited time period (e.g., 50% within a three-year period).
(d) If less than total shift of control, price would be grossed-up
to determine entire value of loss company.
(e) Purchase price limitation would be reduced by loss
company's cash or liquid assets, by business assets
contributed to capital within two years of triggering event
("anti-stuffing" rule to block inflation of acquisition price),
and by proceeds of assets sales (other than in ordinary
course of business) within five years after such event
(business continuity limitation).
2. For description of this proposal, including draft statutory
language, see Tax Notes, Vol. 20, No. 11, p. 385 (Sept. 12,
1983).
3. General comments:
(a) Simple to apply - mechanical and uniform as to stock and
asset acquisitions;
(b) Limitation theory based on capital value of loss company,
rather than income stream, business continuity or
shareholder continuity;
(c) Query - too liberal (permits purchase of tax benefits in
amount up to half of overall acquisition value - compare
1958 Advisory Group, supra, which was more restrictive).
H. Senate Finance Committee Staff Proposal
1. Generally accepts ALI pool of capital approach, supra part D.
2. Principal function of loss carryover rule is averaging:
(a) But proposal requires that loss carryovers must appropriately
relate to the income that it offsets (i.e., match carryover to
the income stream from the pool of capital existing at the
time of the acquisition);
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(b) Free trade in carryovers rejected as resulting in economic
distortions and inefficient capital allocations.
3. Present law thought to be both too loose and too tight in its
application (i.e., allow some carryovers that shouldn't, and block
others that shouldn't).
4. General goals of proposal:
(a) Tax neutrality;
(b) Limit carryovers to the same pool of capital that generated
the loss (i.e., no shift of benefits to "new capital" interests);
(c) Objective rules (greater administrative certainty); would
replace subjective rule of section 269.
5. Dual limitation, depending on type of acquisition:
(a) "Purchase" rule (applies to stock acquisitions, redemptions,
and carryover basis asset acquisitions for non-stock
consideration);
(b) "Merger" rule (applies to qualified stock and asset
acquisitions for stock consideration, and to ownership shifts
by new issue of stock);
(c) Different rules for each, and both can apply to same
acquisition if overlap.
6. Purchase rule (section 382(a) analogue).
(a) Transactions covered:
(i) Significant purchases of outstanding stock after a loss
year (more than 50%, counting only five percent
shareholders, with attribution);
(ii) Carryover basis asset acquisitions (of substantially all
of target's assets) for consideration other than stock;
(iii) Redemptions (including Zenz combined purchase and
redemption deals).
(b) If limitation threshold triggered, carryovers limited to an
assumed rate of return based on price paid for acquired
stock:
(i) Limitation starts in year following change of
ownership trigger;
(ii) Unusable carryovers roll forward to following year
(i.e., deferred, not denied), and unused limitation for a
year added to limitation in the following year;
(iii) Suggested rate of return, 125% of section 6621 rate;
(iv) Shareholder can increase his ownership by 50%
without limitatiop as to such increase (except for
purposes of the general 50% threshold trigger rule).
(c) Questions:
(i) Any time limit for measuring control shift?
(ii) Do recapitalization control shifts trigger limitation
under redemption rule?
(iii) How about non-pro rata split-offs?
7. Merger rule (section 382(b) analogue).
(a) Transactions covered:
(i) Qualified asset acquisitions for stock with a carryover
basis (i.e., acquisition of "substantially all");
(ii) Qualified stock acquisitions for stock (i.e., acquisitions
of "control"), including, for this purpose, triangular
acquisitions; and
(iii) Substantial ownership shifts through new issues of
stock.
(iv) Merger rule and purchase rule can overlap, i.e.,
acquisition of assets for stock and cash - merger rule
applies to stock portion, purchase rule to cash portion.
(b) Exceptions to new stock issue rule:
(i) Pro rata stock issues,
(ii) Control shifts of 50% or less from loss year,
(iii) Stock issue worth less than 20% of all the
corporation's stock.
(c) Qualified stock and asset acquisitions:
(i) Carryovers allowed against post-acquisition income
stream attributable to loss corporation's assets, based
on portion of acquiring corporation's stock issued in
the acquisition (reduced by a statutory table).
(ii) E.g.: If 10% of acquiring corporation's stock issued in
the acquisition, allowable income percentage would be
5%; if 20% issued, allowable income percent is 10%; if
40% issued, income percent is 25%; if 50% issued,
income percent is 35%; if 60% issued, income percent
is 45%; and if 80% issued, income percent is 70%.
(iii) If preferred stock issued, carryovers limited to total
annual yield on the preferred.
(iv) If the issuing corporation already has outstanding
preferred stock, the allowable income limitation must
be reduced by the grossed-up annual yield on that
stock.
(v) Special rules to be provided to deal with hybrid stock,
convertible debt, options, warrants, etc.
(vi) Acquiring corporate groups (i.e., triangulars) apply
limitation by including income of corporation issuing
the stock and its direct and indirect subsidiaries (per
stirpes).
A. If consolidated return filed by acquiring group, the
limitation would be computed on a consolidated ba-
sis;
B. If consolidated returns not filed by group,
limitation applied separately to the loss corporation.
(vii) Acquisitions by loss corporations trigger the merger
limitation if loss company shareholder continuity drops
below 80%.
(d) New stock issues:
(i) Table limitation applied to percentage interest in loss
company's common stock remaining with loss year
shareholders (e.g., if loss corporation issues 25% of its
stock to new investors, allowable post-issue income
percentage would be 63.75%).
(ii) Initially exempted new issues can be subjected to new
issue limitation if stock is subsequently transferred to
outsiders.
(iii) New issues of preferred stock to outsiders will reduce
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offsetable income by the grossed-up annual yield on
such stock.
(e) Special rules:
(i) Built-in gains and losses: net built-in gains at time of
acquisition will increase limitation in year of
recognition; net built-in losses to be limited by
regulations.
(ii) Query definition of built-in gain or loss (Report uses
section 453, but how about long term contracts, order
backlogs and the like?).
(iii) Stock issued to creditors - if loss year creditor, treat
as a purchase of outstanding stock; if post-loss year
creditor, treat as new issue of stock.
8. General comments:
(a) Wither simplicity under this system? Note requirement to
trace loss year shareholders, and value individual assets at
time of acquisition.
(b) Query application where complex capital structure (i.e.,
multiple classes of common, preferred, convertible debt,
warrants, etc.)?
(c) Query whether repeal of section 269 is warranted or
advisable?
(d) Treatment of creditor workouts contra to policy of recent
Bankruptcy Tax Act amendments in 1980?
(e) Substituting a new and unknown mess for an old, but well-
known, mess?

NET OPERATING Loss CARRYOVER:
REFORM PROPOSALS
GERALD G. PORTNEY*
INTRODUCTION TO NET OPERATING LOSSES
Each dollar of tax deductions claimed by a corporation currently
saves 46 cents in federal income tax. Thus, the acquisition of a cor-
poration with accumulated unused deductions (net operating loss
carryovers (NOLs)) represents the potential for effectively earning
tax-exempt income. The NOLs will offset the earnings resulting in
no federal income tax liability. Thus, the stakes often involve sub-
stantial tax savings.
The survival and utilization of corporate NOLs involve many fun-
damental policy decisions including the taxation of the corporation
separate and apart from its shareholders. To comprehend the debate
on the implementation of limitations on NOLs in corporate acquisi-
tions, it is at least helpful to understand the reasons for allowing
NOL deductions, to consider who should benefit from the utilization
of the NOL deductions and to discern the effects various limitations
have on corporate acquisitions.
PURPOSE OF NOL CARRYOVERS
Annual Accounting Periods
Section 1721 allows taxpayers a deduction for losses generated in
future years (carrybacks) and prior years (carryforwards) to miti-
* Principal, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.'s Washington National Tax Practice;
former Associate Chief Counsel (Technical), Internal Revenue Service; B.S., Boston
University; J.D., Suffolk University Law School; LL.M., Boston University School of
Law; Advanced Management Program, Harvard Business School.
1. All references and citations to sections are to sections of the Internal Revenue
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gate the effect of the annual accounting period. Under tax account-
ing rules, the timing of expense deductions may not coincide with
that of the income to which they relate. The carryover of losses rec-
ognizes the impreciseness of the annual accounting period. In United
States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc.,2 Justice O'Conner writing for the Court
said: "Strict adherence to an annual accounting system would create
transactional inequities. Often an apparently completed transaction
will reopen unexpectedly in a subsequent tax year, rendering the ini-
tial reporting improper." 3 The Court concluded that cattle feed cor-
rectly deducted under section 162 must be recaptured when distrib-
uted on liquidation - overriding section 336. Section 172, therefore,
allows an averaging, albeit over a limited time frame, of a taxpayer's
income and deductions.
Business Risk
NOL carryovers are intended to encourage business by allowing a
partial recoupment of losses against past and future income. How-
ever, the NOL carryovers provide an advantage to established busi-
nesses because established businesses have prior taxable income to
offset and receive immediate tax reimbursement. On the other hand,
new business start-ups must wait until taxable income is realized
before tax reimbursement. Thus, in the latter case, their NOLs have
a value less than NOLs generated by an established business. Fur-
ther, we note that this fact encourages conglomeration and consoli-
dation as these allow for an immediate recovery of taxes by reducing
taxes currently payable.
Government Partnership
Most businesses feel as if the taxation of their income is
equivalent to having the government as a partner. Thus, the govern-
ment must share in both good and bad times.
The Loss Itself
Since the government taxes business income, any business loss
should be subsidized by the government regardless of what business
incurred the loss and irrespective of who owned the business. Thus,
any business expenditure should be available for tax refund. Sub-
scribers to this theory believe that limitations on NOLs are unneces-
sary. No NOLs would exist since the government immediately re-
funds a portion of the loss - the notion of recoupment.
Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise indicated.
2. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
3. United States v. Bliss Dairy, Inc. decided with Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Com-
missioner, 460 U.S. 370, 377 (1983).
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Recoupment supporters argue that if an unsuccessful company
cannot claim the tax value of its unrecovered expenses (if the NOL
expires under present law), then a taxation of future earnings is in
reality a taxation of capital. Since a firm's capital is obtained from
the investment of after-tax income of its shareholders, a double tax
results when losses do not generate a tax benefit. Further, recoup-
ment supports risk taking. Since losses are immediately subsidized
there is no doubt or cost associated with whether or when the NOLs
will generate a tax savings.
Opponents point out that recoupment encourages unprofitable
businesses. In fact, businesses that represent economically unsound
investments, will be encouraged. The current tax system encourages
investments in businesses that are economically not viable. Recoup-
ment would carry this to the Nth degree. Further, from a practical
standpoint, recoupment is a budgetary impossibility.
OWNERSHIP OF NET OPERATING Loss CARRY FORWARDS
The Business Owners
Of the possible "owners" of the NOLs, a strong argument can be
made in favor of ownership by the shareholders of the corporation
that generated the losses.
Since the shareholders are the ones with the capital at risk, are
not they the ones who own the NOLs? In a proprietorship situation,
the current tax system places the ownership of the NOLs with pro-
prietor, regardless of whether or not the business that generated the
NOLs is still owned by that proprietor. In theory, a loss corpora-
tion's shareholders stock value reflects the impact of the losses. Thus,
to the extent the losses have any value, should not the shareholders
receive that value?
Current law under section 382(b) (1954 version) adopts the view
that the shareholders own the losses. Thus, in tax-free reorganiza-
tions, losses survive to the extent the shareholders of the loss com-
pany still own stock. The 1976 version of section 3821 ties NOLs to
the corporation's shareholders for both purchases and reorganiza-
tions. The ALP and Senate Finance Committee6 adopt this view for
4. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455, § 806(e), 90 Stat. 1520, 1599
(1976).
5. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C:
PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS (1982).
6. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 1ST Sass., THE REFORM
AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983).
reorganizations.
To some extent, those who advocate the free transferability of
NOLs feel that the shareholders own the NOLs. If NOLs were
freely transferable, then the shareholders would receive full compen-
sation for the NOLs. With the current law uncertainty (e.g., section
269 and section 382(a)(1)(C) - same trade or business), shareholders
of the loss corporation get very little value for their corporation's
NOLs.
The Corporation
The necessary definition of a corporation includes these four crite-
ria at Regulation section 301.7701-2(a)(1): 7
- Continuity of Life
- Centralization of Management
- Liabilities Limited to Corporate Assets
- Free Transferability of Stock.
These features make the corporation an entity separate and distinct
from its owners. As a result, the federal government taxes the in-
come of corporations separate from the income of their shareholders.
Thus, NOLs generated by the corporation are owned by the corpora-
tion to offset corporate income. Section 381 recognizes corporate
ownership by providing for carryover in corporate combinations that
are poolings for tax purposes.
In New Colonial Ice Co. Inc. v. Helvering,8 the assets of the loss
corporation were absorbed by a new corporation, organized solely to
take over the business of the loss corporation. The new corporation
attempted to deduct the NOLs of the acquired corporation pursuant
to what was probably an "F" reorganization. The NOL deductions
were denied since the corporate charter of the loss corporation was
surrendered and the new corporation was not the same taxpayer as
the loss corporation, even though the business and the capital struc-
ture were identical.
In Alprosa Watch Co. v. Commissioner,' all of the taxpayer's
stock was sold to new owners, the historic business was discontinued
(womens' gloves) and a new business started (jewelry). Since the
corporate charter remained intact, losses generated by the discontin-
ued business were allowed to reduce income generated by the new
business.
7. All references and citations to regulations are to Treasury regulations under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless otherwise indicated.
8. 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
9. 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
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Thus, NOL survival in corporate acquisitions was strictly tied to
the survival of the corporate charter. Section 381, adopted with the
1954 Code, while tying ownership of NOLs to the corporation, did
not base survival of losses on charter survival, but on the general
requirements for a tax-free reorganization.
The Corporate Business
Since the business generates the losses and pays the tax, if section
172 is to ameliorate the annual accounting period, and if section 172
is to encourage risk taking, then the business that lost the money
should be the business that benefits from the loss deduction.
In Libson Shops v. Koehler,'0 statutory mergers of sixteen
brother-sister corporations, each operating separate retail stores,
were completed. Three of the corporations had NOLs that the sur-
viving corporation attempted to deduct against post-merger income.
The NOL deduction was denied since the stores that generated the
NOLs continued to lose money after the merger and the losses would
only be allowed to the business that incurred the loss.
Whether or not the death knell has been rung for Libson is not
known. The Ninth Circuit stated Libson is not applicable to 1954
Code years in the decision Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commis-
sioner" However, the IRS took a more limited view in Revenue Rul-
ing 63-40 and agreed not to apply Libson if the shareholders of the
loss corporation were substantially unchanged. 2
Current section 382 (1954 version) provides NOLs of a corpora-
tion will survive a 100% stock purchase as long as the same trade or
business is continued. However, the uncertainty in defining the same
trade or business has left the standard in a state of flux. Regulation
section 1.382(a)-i(h) states that all facts and circumstances deter-
mine if the business is unchanged. Thus, employees, plant, equip-
ment, location, and customers are all factors to be considered. Exam-
ple 2 continues the Libson theory. Also, current section 382, in asset
acquisitions treated as reorganizations under section 368, indirectly
adopts a business continuity standard-perhaps less stringent than
that for stock purchases. Regulation section 1368-1(d) requires busi-
ness continuity in reorganizations.
10. 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
11. 343 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1965).
12. Rev. Rul. 63-40, 1963-1 C.B. 46.
MEASURING THE SURVIVAL OF NET OPERATING LOSSES
Recoupment of Losses
Immediate tax refunds for losses eliminates the need of section
172 and thus for any limitation measurement on NOLs in corporate
transactions.13
Free Transferability of Losses
While losses would only generate tax savings when income is off-
set, no restrictions would apply. Thus, NOLs could be sold just like
any other asset. This adopts the premise that the loss has separate
existence and the stockholders are the owners of the loss.
Some Limitations on Loss Carryovers
Type of Limitations
On the assumption that section 172 is meant to perform an aver-
aging function, some limitations are needed - whether by reference
to the continuity of shareholders, business continuity or state of mind
(section 269) or as under the present system, a combination of all of
the above.
Objective Standards
Measuring the continuity of shareholders involves determining the
period over which a change in shareholders should be measured.
Further, how much continuity is required for NOL survival? Are
NOLs like dividends paid pro rata on each share of stock or should
some shareholder shifts be allowed in recognition that corporations
are separate from the shareholders? Consider the tracing problems
in publicly-held corporations as opposed to closely-held corporations.
Measuring business continuity could be made an objective stan-
dard. 4 However, business continuity, whether as under current sec-
tion 382(a)(1)(C) (1954 version) or Libson becomes a subjective
analysis. Maybe safe harbors should be considered.
Subjective Standards
Section 269 looks to a taxpayer's state of mind to determine if
NOLs still survive. However, see recent cases for problems in apply-
ing section 269.15 More recently, the 1984 legislation expanded 269
13. Campisano & Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offset, 76
Nw. U. L. REV. 709 (1981).
14. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 84-22, 1984-1 C.B. 449, (for ruling purposes, in partial
liquidations, a 20% reduction in employees, revenues and assets is required).
15. Princeton Aviation Corp. v. Commissioner, 47 TCM 575 (1983) and Fairfield
Communities Land Co. and Affiliated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 47 TCM 1194
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to apply to corporate liquidations within two years of a purchase of
80% or more of a corporation's stock by another corporation.
Transactions Limitations Should Consider
Limitations on NOL carryovers should apply both to taxable
transactions such as purchases of corporate stock and purchases of
corporate assets, which involve new business owners, and to tax-free
stock acquisitions under section 368(a)(1)(B) and asset acquisitions
under section 368(A)(1)(a), (C), (D), (G).
No Limitation, But Toll Charge
In sections 367, 108(b) and 56, in transfers to foreign corpora-
tions, in debt discharge in bankruptcy or insolvency, and in allowing
certain tax benefits, a "price" can be extracted for favorable tax
treatment. Perhaps NOLs should not be limited but, when utilized, a
tax collected for allowing the utilization.
SUMMARY
The difficulties in determining the objective of NOL carryovers
and in determining who should benefit from their utilization sets the
stage for the current discussion surrounding the special limitations
on NOLs under section 382. These alternative theories, in effect,
"justify" the existence of the current complexity surrounding limita-
tions in corporate acquisitions. Perhaps the approach should be to
recognize that, for practical reasons, limitations will be implemented
on NOLs so that acquisitions are not completed due to the tax bene-
fits available. The NOLs are not the motivation for the transaction.
Until an overall tax reform is completed, any limitation proposal
should confine itself to that approach. Further, since the current law
is frequently complex to implement and the 1976 changes to section
382 certainly expanded on that complexity, the proposal should con-
tain one standard to be used for both taxable and tax-free acquisi-
tions. The standard should simply and objectively apply to prevent




ALTERNATIVES FOR LIMITING Loss
CARRYOVERS
JAMES S. EUSTICE*
On the loss carryover reform scene, we have a full plate of alter-
natives, including, of course, the possibility that we do nothing, on
the grounds that at least we're reasonably familiar with what we
currently have under the existing regime. Nobody is sure we can
ever draft a statute that astute practitioners won't be able to get
around pretty quickly. At least, we've had the benefit of 30 years of
experience with the present version. It's far from perfect, but it's not
the worst thing that could happen here. On the other hand, we do
have a wide range of reform proposals that are at least worth
summarizing.'
Starting with the various ABA Tax Section Proposals, 2 which
pretty well cover the waterfront here, the drafters initially began
with a relatively minor project focused on a technical tune up of
section 382 and section 269, but did not envision anything terribly
radical. This proposal consisted mainly of moving sections around to
different places in the code and revising various technical features of
those sections. It was not, however, a major conceptual revision of
the loss carryover rules. But in 1982, they came up with something
that was considerably more radical; they proposed adoption of a pure
business continuity limitation, based essentially on the Libson
Shops3 case approach. What Gerry would call the "owner" of the
* Becker Professor of Law, New York University; B.S., LL.B., University of Illinois;
LL.M., New York University School of Law.
1. See Nichols, Net Operating Loss Carryovers and Section 382, 22 TAX NOTES
609 (1984).
2. ABA Tax Section Proposals (unpublished) (discussed at part V.C. of the out-
line infra).
3. Libson Shops v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957).
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tax loss under this approach would be the particular business unit
that produced it. The net effect of this proposal would be similar to
adopting a schedular tax system for business profits and losses.
These limitations would be triggered, however, only if certain statu-
tory thresholds were exceeded. In fact, all of these proposals to limit
loss carryovers require certain triggering thresholds, i.e., major
changes of ownership within a defined period of time. That will be
common to everything mentioned this afternoon. If it is the same
corporation with the same shareholders, none of these proposed limi-
tations will change anything; by that I mean no new capital infu-
sions, no redemptions, and no indirect shifts of ownership. Normal
stock trading would be permitted, so long as a major control shift did
not occur within a relatively short time frame.
This second phase ABA proposal4 lasted about one year, after
which they reached back into the mists of time to the 1958 Advisory
Group Report on Subchapter C.1 This proposal, like the 1958 Advi-
sory Group Report, was essentially a purchase price limitation. In
other words, the acquiring company would be entitled to claim loss
carryovers of the acquired company equal to one half of the
purchase price paid for that company. This limitation would insure
that taxpayers would only be buying a business, rather than
favorable tax benefits of the target, based on the economics of the
acquisition. With this type of limitation, taxpayers would be "over-
paying" if they were just trying to buy tax losses.
I would like to skip the ALI proposal for a moment, because that
blends in with the current thinking of the staffs of the Joint Commit-
tee and Senate Finance.6 Another possibility here would approach
the loss carryover problem from an entirely different perspective. If
you had basic corporate tax reform, which in a major way (not a
minor way) integrated the corporate and shareholder tax systems,
the corporate loss carryover problem would be eliminated. Adoption
of the full flow-through rule would turn corporations into pass-
through entities. Then you would find out who the true owner of the
tax losses are. They are not the corporation, but the owners of the
corporation would obtain the direct and immediate benefits of those
losses. That is, of course, what happens in the case of a sole proprie-
torship. That is also what happens in the partnership arena in Sub-
chapter K; and it is also what happens to a pass-through entity such
4. ABA Tax Section Proposals "second phase" (unpublished)(discussed at part
V.C. of outline, infra).
5. Revised Report of the Advisory Group on Subchapter C [December 8, 1958]
SPECIAL (CCH) (March 3, 1959).
6. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., DESCRIPTION OF
PROPOSAL ON CARRYOVERS OF NET OPERATING LOSSES (Comm. Print 1983); STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE REFORM AND SIMPLICATION OF
THE INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS (Comm. Print 1983).
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as a Subchapter S. The losses pass through to the owners and are
claimed directly by them to the extent that they have sufficient in-
come to absorb these losses (if not, the losses carry forward at the
owner level).
We may, in a sense, already have a crude form of integration in
place under current law. Large corporations have ACRS and the in-
vestment tax credit, which go a long way towards eliminating the
corporate tax, particularly for capital intensive corporations. Safe
harbor leasing is gone, together with the possibility to sell the bene-
fits to those who could use them. Under that regime, it was possible
to say that we had created the chance for corporate America to have
one gigantic consolidated return. That is what safe harbor leasing in
effect accomplished. This, of course, created a severe perception
problem, regardless of how much the economists were pained by its
demise. I think that is why something had to be done to the safe
harbor leasing rules and why something has to be done to the loss
carryover area as well. I doubt if you will ever see free transferabil-
ity of tax losses, for the same reason that you did not see the contin-
uation of safe harbor leasing; it just looks bad, regardless of whether
it is bad. It looks bad and therefore free transferability just isn't
going to happen.
For the small corporations, of course, we have a wide variety of de
facto integration techniques, all of the self-help variety. Election of
Subchapter S, which is now much easier and covers a much wider
range of possibilities, is the most straightforward path to eliminating
taxability at the corporate level. If you want to play games with debt
leverage, which one does now at one's peril after the demise of the
section 385 regulations, large portions of corporate level income can
be sheltered by the interest deduction. I could never understand the
tax bar's resistance to the section 385 regulations. I didn't see how it
was possible for the Treasury to give away any more that it gave on
those regulations. That is what makes me nervous about some cur-
rent reform proposals. Whenever I see the tax bar more or less
united (by more or less united, I mean not open and rampant hostil-
ity), then I start to get worried. I think that we may be giving away
too much of the store. The abortive section 385 regulations seem to
me to have been a classic example of that process. But if you want to
take a chance on high debt leverage, a significant portion of corpo-
rate income can be sheltered by interest deduction. Personal service
corporations, on the other hand, can still effectively zero out. That's
the message of the Keller case:7 put everything possible in the pen-
sion plan and take the rest of the corporate profits as compensation.
Thus, the corporation is merely a "funnel." Although we now have
section 269A to restrain this practice for the future, everybody that
was in the trough was grandfathered so they can cheerfully keep
feeding.
The likelihood of formal integration passing, at least this year, is
nil. I am not so sure about the future; but present indications are
that integration involves a major loss of revenue, which renders this
an extremely remote prospect for the near term at least. Once we get
the deficits down under a couple of trillion, maybe then they will
think about it.
Finally, I want to mention the Stark Bill,8 part of an earlier ver-
sion of the 1982 TEFRA legislation, that was being generated by the
House during the summer of 1982. I call this the "Son of the 1976
Act" because it was based largely, if not predominantly, on the 1976
provisions, with some technical tightening of those provisions. The
key for survivability of carryovers under that proposal was share-
holder continuity. Like the 1976 proposals, it also adopted a unitary
test for all forms of acquisition, a single continuity line. If you vio-
lated that line you started a disproportionate consumption of the cor-
poration's tax history. It didn't make any difference how the acquisi-
tion was structured. Due to the excessive legislative activity that was
in progress, however, this legislation was tabled on the grounds of
being premature, and more time was necessary to think about the
loss carryover problems. We have all been thinking about this prob-
lem for some time, but in any event it was shelved.
We are left with the combination of the ALI reform proposal and
the Finance Committee Staff proposal. This proposal is heavily, if
not predominantly, based on the ALI proposal, to which I would like
to turn after mentioning briefly one other alternative reform
proposal.
I mention it only briefly because the current congressional staff
thinking (and perhaps even at Treasury as well) is not infatuated
with this proposal, on the grounds that it may give up too much. But
I find, on simplicity grounds alone, it is my personal number one
(including the present system). This is the proposal discussed in sec-
tion G of part V of the outline, based on an article by Richard Ba-
con and Nicholas Tomosulo, described more fully in the Tax Notes"
publication. This proposal also contains a draft statute, which is
what I have yet to see from any of the other reform proposals. My
7. Keller v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983).
8. H.R. 6295, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 1928 (1982).
9. Bacon & Tomosulo, Net Operating Loss Carryovers: The Search for Corpo-
rate Identity, 20 TAX NOTES 836 (1983).
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mind doesn't get activated until I see what the legislation actually
looks like, and this one at least has something that looks like legisla-
tion. In any event, I call this provision "Son of the 1958 advisory
group," or maybe even "twins," because it's twice as good as the
1958 advisory group proposal. The 1958 advisory group would have
limited the acquisition of loss carryovers to one half of the acquiring
corporation's purchase price. 10 The Bacon-Tomosulo proposal goes
the whole way, and would limit loss carryovers by the full purchase
price paid for the loss company. They argue, persuasively to me at
least, that this limitation would do enough of a job to effectively re-
strain whatever bad things are going on in this loss acquisition area.
The criticism of this approach is that it allows the use, or con-
sumption, of the loss carryovers more rapidly than some of the other
reform proposals, and hence is subject to what the congressional
staffs feel is an excess of liberality. Despite the economic argument
that one still wouldn't buy a loss business under this type of limita-
tion solely for the tax benefits, some tax incentive for the acquisition
may exist because of the accelerated timing benefits. In any event,
the basic thrust of the Bacon-Tomosulo proposal is to eliminate the
purely tax-motivated acquisition transaction, and even the domi-
nantly tax-motivated transaction as well. In effect, only transactions
involving an acquisition of a loss company for its business will be
viable economically under this proposal. Basically, this is what all of
these loss carryover limitations are about. Moreover, the Bacon-
Tomosulo proposal is by far the simpler of any of the various reform
regimes, both to comprehend and to apply in practice. Hence, on
both those scores, I would vote for this one.
The Finance Committee staff proposal, as I mentioned previously,
is grounded essentially in the ALI approach. Basically, what is going
on here are two concepts; they clearly allow transferability of tax
losses, but instead of concentrating on the loss itself, they concen-
trate on a future income stream from a historic pool of capital ex-
isting at the time of the acquisition against which that loss can be
absorbed." As compared with Bacon-Tomosulo, which concentrates
on a capital value purchase price limitation, this limitation operates
in the context of matching the carryover to a future stream of in-
come from the pool of capital of the loss company at the time of its
acquisition. Unlike the Bacon-Tomosulo approach and the 1976 ap-
proach, however, this proposal adopts a dual limitation. We would
10. "Report of Advisory Group, supra note 5.
11. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, supra note 6.
have two separate limitation rules here; one for "purchases" and one
for "mergers." Moreover, these limitations would operate in different
ways, and could also overlap in a given transaction. In other words,
these limitations could operate simultaneously in the same acquisi-
tion (which in my view is a negative feature of this approach) and
they could operate for 15 years for the life of the loss (because the
key to this provision is who are the major stockholders in the year
the loss was sustained). Since the basic limitation under this provi-
sion is shareholder identity in the year of the loss, you are going to
have to keep track of those shareholders for the life of the loss. If
you have a relatively active loss corporation that has undergone own-
ership changes, engaged in acquisitions and mergers, has a complex
capital structure, does recapitalizations, and/or issues new stock, you
are in for a lot of fun under this provision. I would look forward or,
maybe dread is a better word, to the statutory language; this is not
going to be an easy statute to put into print. The principal contours
of this proposal are described at section H of part V of the outline.
This leaves me with a final basic question; how much do you want
to strive for in the way of perfection here, and how much do you
want to concede to the practicalities of the real world? How one
answers that question may well explain the disparity of opinions on
how to deal with the loss carryover problems. For my part, I don't
believe there is a "right answer" here. Rather, what the tax world
needs is an answer, even any answer, so long as the regime that is
finally selected is generally perceived as a fair and reasonable one
that can't be egregiously abused. High on my priority scale here
would be the simplicity factor, although it is fairly obvious by now
that the loss carryover question does not readily yield to simple an-
swers. I do agree, however, that it is time to do something, even if
that something is to stand pat with one existing system. The present
state of "suspended animation" with its attendant uncertainties has
to stop, and the business of finally deciding, which is after all, Con-
gress' principal role, must be done.
Two final points: I have some doubts on whether dropping the bus-
iness-continuity limitation is the proper way to go in view of the fact
the business that generated the loss is arguably the taxpayer that
should be deemed to own that loss. It may well be that the business
history should most appropriately follow the particular business that
gave rise to that history. Finally, I also have strong reservations
about the wisdom (which all of these proposals share) of dropping
section 269, on the grounds that I am convinced as we will never be
able to draft the perfect statute and it's always nice for section 269
to be lurking out there to restrain the overly zealous. I find this sec-
tion to be a very useful defense mechanism in practice for re-
straining excessively aggressive transactions.
[VOL. 22: 149, 1985] Limiting Loss Carryovers
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
In summary, it's clear that we haven't come close to answering
any of the numerous questions noted today; in fact we probably have
raised more problems and are more confused than when this session
began; but at least I think we are confused about more important
things on a higher level.

